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1.
Introduction "Upon the strong advice of the court and in order to avoid further and substantial litigation costs, the parties hereby agree [...]"
-phrasing in judicial decree
One of the major tasks of legal systems is to resolve legal disputes. A significant share of these disputes is resolved by adjudicators via court decisions. However, many legal disputes never reach the final stage of the litigation process but are successfully settled through court proceedings. Litigants often prefer to negotiate agreements because these shorten legal procedures, resolve uncertainty and save litigation expenses.
However, not only litigants are interested in reaching settlements. The state as the financer of the legal institutions is also interested in agreements between the litigants because extensive court proceedings and written verdicts cost more than early settlements. Although court fees contribute to financing legal institutions, they are typically insufficient to cover the entire costs of operating legal institutions. Because taxpayers must cover the remaining costs, policymakers around the globe are interested in designing legal systems that promote early settlements. As an example, the U.S.
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1982, p. 19) suggests that "settlement should be facilitated at as early a stage of the litigation as possible" because it "results in savings to the litigants and the judicial system". Even more pronounced, the MINISTRY OF JUSTICE (2010, p. 1) of the United Kingdom states: "the intended outcome [of its legal policy] is earlier settlements at reasonable levels of damages and reduced costs". The
German government explicitly expressed its dissatisfaction with the prevailing low settlement rates in civil litigation and repeatedly amended German civil process law in order to promote amicable agreements (BUNDESTAG, 2000, pp. 58).
Currently, many countries have adopted laws and statutes that aim to foster the negotiation of settlements and to make reasonable settlement offers more appealing to the litigants. Many national procedural laws were amended to allow for pretrial conferences, e.g., the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rule 16 and the German § 278
Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO), both of which aim at facilitating negotiations. The German 3 procedural rule explicitly advises judges to consider settlements and enables the adjudicator to actively propose settlement offers during proceedings. In the U.K., Civil
Procedure Rules (CPR) Part 36 incentivizes parties to make settlement offers. Under a Part 36 offer, litigants who refuse settlement proposals but fail to reach better results under subsequent court rulings face additional cost penalties. In a comparable approach, the Civil Dispute Resolution Act enables Australian courts to exercise discretion in awarding costs to parties who did not take genuine steps to resolve the dispute before trial. To further reduce legal costs and promote settlements, the European Union enacted Directive 2008/52/EC, which institutionalizes judicial and extrajudicial mediation in its member states.
To be able to construct legal systems that facilitate early settlements of legal disputes, it is necessary to identify the factors that have a significant impact on settlement probability. 1 However, little empirical knowledge is available on this issue as yet. A major reason for the scarcity of empirical evidence on the determinants of settlement probability is that suitable data to study this issue are often unavailable. Databases on verdicts are often available; however, according to the well-established Case Selection Hypothesis put forward by PRIEST and KLEIN (1984) , verdicts (and thus settlements) are not a random draw from the pool of all legal disputes. Empirical evidence that is solely based on verdict databases is thus likely biased. To gain unbiased evidence on the determinants of settlement probability, a random sample of legal disputes that contains both court decisions and settlements is necessary. However, these types of data are mostly unavailable as yet.
In this paper, we contribute to filling the described gap in the literature. Using a novel, hand-collected dataset consisting of 860 case records from a German trial court, we employ the logit regression technique to identify factors that influence the probability of The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 introduces and summarizes the dataset. In section 4, we report the empirical results of our analysis of the determinants of in-court settlement probability.
Section 5 reassesses the role of gender issues in settlement capabilities. Finally, section 6 summarizes the main results and draws some conclusions. We especially discuss the implications of our results for policymakers.
Related Literature
The question of which factors determine whether a trial is resolved by settlement or by verdict has always been of major interest to law and economics scholars. Whenever verdicts are associated with significant legal costs for both involved parties, as is ty pical in many legal systems (e.g., the United States), one might expect that legal disputes are always solved by settlement. The early, mostly theoretical literature in this field predominantly focused on explaining why a significant share of all trials ended with verdicts rather than being settled at earlier stages. (2009) refrain from studying the determinants of verdicts but calculate settlement rates for different districts and case categories, such as tort law or employment discrimination.
They find that settlement rates vary significantly between districts. However, they also present empirical evidence in favor of the hypothesis that settlements occur in the various subfields of law with differing probabilities. In particular, tort law cases were settled significantly more often relative to the reference category of contract law.
There is also a growing literature that addresses the question of whether gender matters in bargaining situations. speculates that female judges tend to express pro-plaintiff preferences in such cases and to eventually persuade their male colleagues.
Data
Our empirical analysis is based on legal proceedings in an intermediate German trial court (Amtsgericht) in Hamburg and consists of a random sample of 2,360 case records that originate from 2009. 9 As many as 689 cases in our sample (37 percent) were resolved with a default judgment because one of the two parties failed to appear in court. In 173 cases, the defendant recognized the plaintiff´s claim. The claim was abandoned by the plaintiff in 24 percent of the cases because the suit was unsubstantiated or the parties successfully resolved the dispute without further court action. In a small number of cases (3 percent),
the lawsuit aimed at a preliminary injunction. The remaining 860 cases led to court proceedings. In 279 of these cases, the parties eventually established an in-court settlement under the judge´s supervision and the dispute was resolved. In the remaining 581 cases (25 percent), the court had to promulgate a first-instance decision. Out of 377 appealable verdicts, however, 139 trial court decisions were later appealed, and the legal proceedings continued in a higher court (Landgericht). 10 Our estimates are based on the 860 observations of legal proceedings that required court action for resolution by either court ruling or in-court settlement. The respective 9 outcome is captured by the binary dependent variable SETTLEMENT, which is defined as "1" whenever a settlement was achieved and "0" otherwise.
We consider three groups of predictor variables in our empirical approach (for some descriptive statistics, see Table 1 ).
The first group of predictors further describes the characteristics of the referring case. We distinguish between cases from the following fields of law by coding suitable dummy variables: contract law (L_CONTRACT), tort law (L_TORTS), tenancy law (L_TENANCY), traffic law (L_TRAFFIC) and other fields of law (L_OTHER).
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In addition, we have information on whether advocates were involved in the case. The dummy P_ADVOCATE (D_ADVOCATE) describes whether the plaintiff (defendant) was supported by an advocate. We also know whether the plaintiff and/or the defendant is a firm or another type of organization. This information is captured by the dummy variables P_FIRM and D_FIRM. Furthermore, our dataset also includes information on the value of the matter in dispute (VALUE). Finally, we know how many pages of correspondence between the parties and the court were exchanged (CORRESPONDENCE), which is a good proxy for the level of aggressiveness with which the involved parties pursued their legal claims.
The second group of variables describes the characteristics of the judge who was concerned with the referring case. To control for judges´ experience and seniority, we include the judge's tenure in our analysis (TENURE The dummy variable ORAL reports whether at least one oral hearing between the involved parties took place. 13 We also control for the number of hearing days H_DAYS and the total duration of the legal case (DURATION). 
Determinants of Settlement Probability
Because our explanatory variable SETTLEMENT is binary, we employ a logit estimation approach to identify the factors that have a systematic impact on in-court settlements. As determinants of settlements, we consider all three groups of variables that were described in the previous subsection. Moreover, an analysis of the bivariate correlations indicates that our estimation does not suffer from multicollinearity problems. 16 14 We refrain from using judge-fixed-effects because this woul d not allow adding other judge-specific variables such as gender or experience to the estimation equation. 15 We conduct the H-L test with 8, 10 and 12 groups . While the chi²-statistic varies, the p-values always exceed the 20 percent level, thereby r ejecting the test's null hypothesis that the model is not well specified. The referring estimation results are shown in table A2 in the Annex. 16 See Table A3 in the Annex. We report the results of a logistic regression with standard errors at the judge level. The reference category for the field of law is L_ CONTRACT. We report marginal effects at the mean; however, all dummy variables were set to zero. Because the field-of-law dumm ies are categories of the same underlying variable, we fo llow BARTUS (2005) in reporting these marginal effects. Significan ce levels: '***'<0.01; '**'<0.05; '*'<0.1 Table 2 . Logistic Regression Results for the Determinants of Settlements. Table 2 also reports the estimated coefficients of the employed control variables (column 2), the z-values (column 3) and the corresponding p-values (column 4). Column 5 shows the marginal effects for those variables, which are found to have a significant effect on settlement probability. Altogether, we find 7 of the employed independent variables to be significantly related to in-court settlements. Interestingly, we find significant determinants of in-court settlements in all three groups of independent variables -casespecific, judge-related and procedural.
Two variables among the case-specific factors were revealed to have significant effects on the probability of successful settlements. First, we find traffic law cases to be settled significantly less often than cases in the reference category of contract law.
Because police reports, witnesses and expert opinions typically provide accurate evidence on traffic accidents, the righteous claimant may have comparatively little incentive to give in to a settlement offer. 17 The marginal effect of 16.9 percentage points is large. Cases from all other categories do not differ significantly from contract law in terms of settlement probability. This might be the result of the fact that these cases are less clear and more difficult to verify than traffic law cases. The second case-related variable that was found to be significant was the dummy variable that indicates whether the plaintiff was a firm or other type of organization. More precisely, we find supporting evidence for the hypothesis that a plaintiff firm is more interested in attaining a court decision once it decides to go to court. Whenever a firm files a case, the probability of a settlement declines by 8.1 percentage points. Firms and large organizations are likely accustomed to lawsuits and may further seek to establish precedents in their favor. Compared with firms, private plaintiffs may be less experienced in lawsuits, and although we control explicitly for the values in dispute, this value might amount to a larger share of wealth whenever individual plaintiffs are concerned. We find no significant effects of advocate representation for either party, and the same holds true for the value in dispute and for party correspondence.
Only one out of the three judge-related variables that were considered was found to have a significant effect on successful settlements. Settlements are more likely whenever the responsible judge holds a Ph.D. Again, the effect is very large: judges with a Ph.D. are more likely to obtain a settlement by 14.9 percentage points. Various factors might contribute to explaining this finding. One might argue that holding a Ph.D. is a signal of judicial competence and that one component of this competence is the ability to accurately assess complex legal situations. This competence likely increases the probability of arranging settlements between the involved parties. From the litigants´ point of view, a Ph.D. might add further authority to the judge´s words, increasing the probability that the parties will agree to a settlement proposal. Moreover, judges with a Ph.D. might have developed techniques to manage excessive workloads and might thus regard swift settlements as useful instruments for enhancing their performance records.
Tenure is not revealed to have a systematic effect on settlement rates. We also find no significant coefficient for the dummy variable for female judges. That is, in general at least, female judges do not appear to differ from their male counterparts in their ability to arrange in-court settlements. However, we reassess the gender issue in more depth in Section 5 of this paper.
One might expect that procedural rules have major relevance for settlement negotiations because they shape the circumstances under which the negotiations take place. In fact, all of the procedural variables that we included in our estimation approach were found to be significantly related to settlement decisions. First, we found settlements to be much more likely whenever at least one oral proceeding was held. A hearing between the involved parties increases the probability of an in-court settlement by 26.9 percentage points. An oral proceeding allows the opposing litigants to explain their legal claims in person, which is more likely to lead to negotiation. During hearings, the judge can also better utilize his mediation skills than in written correspondence. However, repeated oral proceedings lower the probability of the parties reaching a settlement; settlement probability decreases by 17.0 percentage points for a standard deviation increase in hearing days. This result, however, must be considered with caution. In principle, the finding is highly plausible because settlements are best negotiated on the first day of litigation; with ongoing proceedings, the evidence and the legal situation become clearer, and the party in the better position has little incentive to give in to any compromise. However, we are likely facing an endogeneity problem here because hearing 16 days can only increase in number when no settlement has been reached. 18 Similar to the results for the number of hearing days, we find a negative and significant effect of the length of the process on settlement probability. Again, this finding is plausible but likely suffers from endogeneity. 19 Finally, appealability is found to have a statistically significant and positive impact on the probability of a settlement. If a court decision is appealable, the probability of settling in advance increases by 12.5 percentage points. Parties appear to be more eager to accept a court ruling when they can expect to end the legal dispute with a definite verdict. A "once and for all" settlement is more tempting if the court ruling´s winning party expects the decision to be appealed by the opposing party. Thus, the conditions that determine appealability are found to be important: more requirements for appeal likely reduce the total number of appellate reviews (thus saving costs 20 ) but at the same time decrease the parties´ interest in settlements.
To study the stability of the results, we repeated the estimations using unconditional and conditional judge fixed effects. Although we had to exclude the judgespecific control variables in this case, the results for the remaining independent variables remained qualitatively unchanged. 21 We also estimated a reduced model using only the significant predictors in the regression equation without effect on the qualitative results. 17 
Gender Effects Reconsidered
In the last section, we touched upon the question of whether judges of differing genders also experience differing success in arranging in-court settlements. The previously reported results did not support the hypothesis that male and female judges differ in their general abilities to arrange in-court settlements. However, the chosen estimation approach does not allow for ruling out that judges' gender plays a role in the various subfields of law. A recent article by CROSON and GNEEZY (2009) (see table 3 , models I to IV). We follow the traditional approach to interpreting logistic model interactions, and we calculate the coefficients and standard errors of the interaction effect. 22 The estimation results are reported in Table 3 . , ,    as follows: 
Remarks:
We report the results of a logistic regression with standard errors at the judge level. The reference category for the field of law is L_ CONTRACT. Significance levels: '***'<0.01 ; '**'<0.05 ; '*'<0.1 Table 3 . Subset Analysis and Interaction Effects for Gender.
Interestingly, we in fact find supporting evidence for the hypothesis that judges of different genders exhibit different abilities to arrange settlements in two subfields of law.
First, we find that female judges exhibit a lower probability of arranging in-court settlements in tort law. Second, we find the opposite effect in the field of tenancy law; that is, female judges more often arrange settlements between the parties in tenancy law cases. Both effects are found to be highly significant. 23 The latter effect is particularly strong, and its inclusion provides a substantial contribution to the fit of the regression model. 24 In addition to the interaction term, the coefficients for the related main effects for L_TORTS and L_TENANCY also become significant in the respective models. For traffic accidents and other case categories, we find no statistically significant interaction with the judge´s gender.
AI and NORTON (2003) provide an alternative way of analyzing logistic model interactions by basing their calculations on the estimated cross-derivative of the terms and including all other predictors that contribute to the overall explanation of the response.
The advantage of this approach is that the determined interaction effect is conditional on the independent variables and thus allows for a more detailed interpretation. To verify the robustness of our findings, we follow this approach and calculate the respective interaction effects as proposed in AI, NORTON and WANG (2004) ; the results are shown in The results are found to be consistent with our previous findings. Both interaction effects have the same sign as before and are, on average, highly significant. In addition, Figure 1 displays the z-statistic for each observation, depending on the estimated probability of settlement. Compared with the reference category of contract law, we find that the interaction effect between judge´s gender and tort law is negative but insignificant for most cases with a very low probability of settlement. However, with increasing estimated probability of settlement, the interaction effect becomes more often significant; for estimated probabilities larger than 20 percent, nearly all observations are significantly lower than zero. We find a similar result for the interaction between judge´s gender and tenancy law. The effect is found to be positive but insignificant for low probabilities of settlement, but the significance increases once a settlement becomes more probable. For settlement probabilities larger than 20 percent, again, nearly all observations deliver significantly positive effects. The displayed patterns indicate that the judge´s gender does not matter whenever the party positions are so entrenched that any attempt at compromise is hopeless. As soon as there is any chance that settlements can be arranged, gender issues come to play a role in successfully reaching a settlement (at least with regard to tort and tenancy law). Interestingly, we again do not find systematic effects for the other law categories. In light of the earlier discussed fact that traffic law settlements are comparatively rare because the litigants show strong interest in court rulings, this is not particularly surprising. Whenever settlement rates in a subfield of law are generally low, there is little room for the involved judges to mediate.
Although we cannot formally test why female judges are more effective in arranging settlements in tenancy law but the opposite holds true in tort law, we nevertheless might speculate somewhat about possible reasons for these findings. One possible explanation is that tenancy cases typically originate from frictions in the longterm relationship between the litigants (and often, continuing of this relationship is at least essential for one party), whereas the relationships in tort law cases are typically somewhat coincidental. Female arbitrators might be more able to moderate and also more empathetic regarding existing malfunctioning relationships than their male counterparts, 22 but they might lack these skills in the direct and volatile confrontations of tort law cases.
A different (and perhaps somewhat more provocative) explanation might be that female judges are more sensitive to the outcomes of lawsuits: failing to settle a tenancy case may often result in a delicate situation for the tenant as the inferior contract party, for example, in the case of a forced eviction. Settling a tort law case, however, might be perceived by a female judge as unfair to the victim or insufficient for restoring public order. Thus, a female judge may subconsciously prefer to express her beliefs in a court ruling and thereby suppress her commitment to settling.
Summary and Conclusions
As we argued in the introduction of this paper, governments around the globe are interested in high settlement rates in civil law litigation. To achieve these high settlement rates, governments need to know which factors have a significant impact on settlement probability. Knowledge of these factors is a prerequisite for the adequate and efficient design of legal institutions and procedures. This paper aims at increasing our knowledge regarding the determinants of settlement probability. Based on a dataset from a German trial court, we study which case-specific, judge-related and procedural factors have a significant impact on in-court settlement probability.
We find that two case-specific factors have a significant impact on settlement probability: the relevant field of law and the legal personality of the plaintiff. Traffic law cases tend to be settled with lower probability than the reference category of contract law, and the same holds true for cases in which the plaintiff is an enterprise. However, casespecific factors can in general hardly be influenced by legislators.
Because procedural rules are defined or at least influenced by legislators, they are generally better suited as policy instruments aimed at achieving high settlement rates. Our empirical study identifies a number of procedural factors that have a systematic influence on settlement probability. First, we find significantly higher settlement rates in cases with 23 at least one oral hearing. One might therefore conclude that legislators should strive for a primacy of oral proceedings when they are interested in high settlement rates. Second, we find that the number of hearing days has a negative impact on settlement probability.
Although, as we explained earlier, this finding must be interpreted cautiously, it tends to justify the procedural rules that penalize parties who refuse settlement offers that are better than the final court rulings. Such procedural rules are applied in, e.g., Australia and in the United Kingdom. Third, we find that the rules for appealability have a significant impact on settlement probability; that is, cases that can be appealed exhibit significantly higher settlement probability. Clearly, legislators face a trade-off here. When the legal preconditions for a case to be appealable increase, the higher courts´ workloads decrease.
However, this comes at the price of lower settlement rates in the courts of first instance.
We also find empirical evidence in favor of the hypothesis that judges differ in their abilities to arrange in-court settlements between the involved parties. Interestingly, judges with a Ph.D. successfully arrange settlements with a significantly higher probability. Although we did discuss different arguments behind this finding, it appears that employing a judge with a Ph.D. contributes to increasing the settlement rate. We also find gender differences in arranging in-court settlements. Although there is little empirical evidence in favor of the hypothesis that male and f emale judges in general differ in their abilities to reach in-court settlements, we identified gender-related differences in two subfields of law. Whereas male judges are more successful in arranging settlements in tort law, the opposite holds true in tenancy cases; as a consequence, it might prove to be useful to allocate male judges primarily to tort law cases and female judges to tenancy cases.
Although our empirical study has some highly interesting policy implications, we tend to be cautious in generalizing our results. This approach especially holds true with respect to the judge-related factors because the number of different judges in our sample was not particularly large. However, our study provides a number of policy-relevant findings that might prove to be highly useful if they are further substantiated in future empirical studies with comparable designs.
Annex Table A1 . Settlement Rates in Sample. Table A6 . Calculated Interaction Effects. 
